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ABSTRACT 
This pa.per doclUDents the radical restructuring of the supply of agricultural credit in 
Portugal in the 1980s. In the previous decade camnercial banks and the Ministry of 
Agriculture programs daninated the supply of agricultural finance. However by 1986 
the national neb«:>rk of agricultural credit cooperatives (caixas de Credito Agricola 
Mutuo) had emerged as the major supplier of agricultural credit in the country. 
Controversies such as portfolio concentration, a high incidence of rescheduled loans, 
high equity multipliers, low capital asset ratios and unstable and ambiguous rate of 
return on equity(net worth) have led to the creation of a secorxi tier institution to 
intermediate excess liquidity in the network and act as a lender of last resort. 
Statutory limitations on CCAM lending activity and controversies surrounding a new 
national bank-type role for the second tier institution currently create llllCertainty 
about the future of the CCAM system in Portugal. 
Agricultural Credit COOperatives and the Restructurin;J 
of the SUpply of Agricultural Credit in Portugal: Healthy 
Innovation or Institutional Collapse ? 
I. Introduction 
The institutional framework and supply of agricultural credit in Portugal 
experienced dramatic changes during the 1980s. In the previous decade government 
credit channels through the Ministry of Agriculture or through the recently 
nationalized comnercial bank network dominated the institutional supply of credit 
to agricultural producers in the country. Yet within five years this scenario 
changed. '!his paper documents that change and underscores the pattern of 
decentralization of agricultural credit supply in the 1980s through the extensive 
network of small agricultural credit cooperatives in the country (hereafter 
referred to as CCAMs after the Portuguese acronym cailcas de Credito Agricola 
Mutno). To highlight these changes we look not only at the profile of change in 
the rural financial markets of the country, but also, at the changes within the 
structure of assets and liabilities for the CCAMs in a key growth region of 
Portugal, the Algarve. The resu1 ts indicate that this decentralized pattern of 
growth of agricultural credit carries both pran.ise and p::>tential dangers for the 
future of agricultural finance in Portugal. 
II. The Evolution of Agricultural Credit Markets in Portugal in the 1980s 
Table 1 sets forth the major indicators of credit activity in the financial 
markets of Portugal in the first half of the 1980s. Not surprisingly the world 
recession affected the performance of the credit markets of the country. The 
first panel underscores the rapid decline in both agricultural and non-
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agricultural credit from 1980 to 1985, however the decline in the real value of 
new loans to agriculture was more striking than for non-agricultural credit. 
Panel 2 illustrates how this decline was reflected as a percent of their 
respective sectoral GDPs. In general the decline in non-agricultural credit was 
less severe than the decline in non-agricultural GDP, hence the ratio by 1984 and 
1985 had risen in canparison to 1979 or 1980. The agricultural sector (in line 
2b) was much less serviced with credit throughout this period with credit to GDP 
ratios far lower than those registered by the non-agricultural sector. 
Nevertheless these ratios canpare favorably to those for other middle incane LDCs 
but \Ulfavorably for other lower incane European countries. By the end of the 
period the ratio was roughly the same as in the beginning. 
The surprising finding stanis out in panel 3. It is clear that the relative 
role of the small scale agricultural credit cooperatives in the total supply of 
agricultural credit grew appreciably during this period (from roughly one-fifth 
to two thirds) . The balance of this paper is concerned with why this happened, 
how it changed the financial structure of these cooperatives am the current 
controversies surrounding their future role as a major supplier of credit to 
Portuguese farmers. 
Despite the gradual liberalization of economic policies in Portugal in the 
1980s price controls constrained the rate of return for many agricultural 
products for most of this period. At the same time declining market demand 
induced by the recession of the early 1980s added to the risk of agricultural 
investments. As a resu1 t, the canmercial bank network began to ration out this 
risky and low rate of return agricultural clientele fran their portfolios. The 
agricultural credit cooperatives, on the other hand, were prohibited fran 
eJViging in similar behavior. By statute they are only allaei to ma:tce loans to 
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agriculture since they are limited to making loans to their members who by law 
can only be farmers. Hence the CCAMs by default began to inherit a 
proportionately larger share of the agricultural portfolio in the Portuguese 
econany. 
Another developnent from 1980 to 1986 was the creation of the .Agricultural 
an:i Fisheries Investment Finance System (SIFAP) in which government rediscount 
funds were made available at subsidized interest rates largely for medium and 
long term investment loans in agriculture. This tended to lengthen the portfolio 
of the CCAMs. The peak years of this financing was 1980-1982 which accounts for 
the rise in the agricultural credit to GDP ratio in 1981-82 {line 2b in Table 1). 
However by 1984-5 this financing had declined in importance. Still this 
alternative source of financing did allow the CCAMs to break away frail the rigid 
control arxi supervision of the Ce.ba Gera1 de Depoei tos ( CGD) • This large 
government savings bank had directed the operation of the several hundred CCAMs 
scattered throughout the country in their respective nnmicipalities (cacselhos) 
where they were to service the loan needs of their farmer members. This 
connection with the CGD was gradually renDVed fran 1979 onwards when the network 
of CCAMs were allowed to mobilize their CMrl deposits and secure longer term loan 
financing fran the SIFAP. The growing financial autonany of the CCAMs fran 1979 
onwards forms the basis of the rest of the paper as we evaluate their progress 
through a case study of the CCAMs in the important Southern region of the 
country I the Algazve • 
III. The Organi:zatianal Restructuring of Rural Finance in Portugal: 
The Case of the Algarve CCAMs 
The Algarve is a dynamic agricul tura1 region in Southernmost Portugal in 
which the growth of horticultural products in intensive greenhouse operatioos 
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marks the 1980s. Seventeen CCAMs operate in their respective county-sized 
"conselhos". Five of these credit cooperatives are quite large in assets and 
liabilities {those located in the conselhos of M:>nchique, Portimao, Faro, Silves 
and Lagoa}. The other thirteen are of more modest or smaller sizes serving a 
lower income and less dynamic agricultural clientele. This split also reflects 
the heterogeneous nature of the national network of CCAMs in which roughly 18-20 
credit cooperatives are quite large while the remaining 180 or so active CCAMs 
are smaller in size. Finally the experience of the Algarve CCAMs offers a 
valuable insight into the changing structure of assets and liabilities for the 
more dynamic cooperatives of the national network. This is due to the fact that 
the Algarve network grew more rapidly than the national network as a whole, 
increasing its share of total system-wide deposits from 8.6 percent in 1981 to 
10.9 percent in 1986 and system-wide loans fran 7.9 percent in 1981 to 11.2 
percent in 1986. 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 summarize the experience of the CCAMs in the Algarve in 
the first half of the 1980S. 
1. Table 2 shows a distinct shift in the structure of assets and 
liabilities for these 17 credit cooperatives. The source of funding 
(i.e. liabilities) has shifted fran largely outside borradngs (i.e. CGD 
funds) in 1980 to own deJ;XJSi ts by 1986. This reflects the gradng 
financial autonany of the CCAMs as they have cane to rely irore on local 
depositors for loan resources. 
2. Table 2 also shows a shift in the structure of assets as loans have 
declined from 82 percent of total assets in 1980 to 60 percent in 1986. 
On the other hand, deposits in other CCAMs, in branches of commercial 
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banks and in the recently created Central Liquidity Fun1 for the 
national network (the ca.ixa Central) have gram fran 15.9 percent of 
total assets in 1980 to 28.5 percent in 1986. Thus as these Algarve 
CCAMs gained greater autonany through local deposit mobilization 
strategies, they became :m:>re conservative in their lending practices. 
Instead of lending out all their resources they hedged by increasing the 
share of their risk-free assets (i.e.deposits in other institutions). 
3. The net worth (or ca.pi tal) base, except for a brief rise in 1986 
generally has been declininJ du.ring this period as a share of total 
liabilities. The implications of this small capital base can be seen in 
Table 3 where unusually high rates of return on equity are recorded for 
the Algarve group of CCAMs. This in turn~ out of unusually high 
equity multipliers in line 2 of Table 3 and canmensura.tely lOW' capital 
asset ratios (line 3). Banks in developed countries rarely record 
equity multipliers beyond 20 to 1 or capital asset ratios below 6 
percent. The CCAM results in Table 3 are usually above or below these 
two thresholds. In short the CCAMs have leveraged their meager capital 
base into unusually high asset positions. On the one han:i this 
potentially w.lnerable situation is partially offset or minimized ~ 
having a good portion of their assets held in risk-free deposits. On 
the other hand these high rates of return are clearly overstated in that 
the net income used for this measure includes accrued (but uncollected) 
loan interest payments as income received ( fran delinquent or 
rescheduled loans). 'lhus higher capital asset ratios are clearly 
advisable to cover potantial default risks. 
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4. An additional feature of this slim capital base is the highly unstable 
fluctuation in the rates of return on capital or equity. Lines 1 (a) 
and (b) in Table 3 illustrate this profile with ~ measures of 
dispersion. Table 4 highlights the fact that this instability is in 
part associated with greater earnings fluctuations for the smaller units 
in the network. Line one of Table 4 shows there is a negative 
correlation between the coefficient of variation for the rates of return 
on equity over the period 1978-86 and the size of the CCAMs (in total 
assets) in 1986 . Similarly there is a negative tendency (though not 
statistically significant) between the rank order of rates of return in 
1985 and 1986 and the size of the CCAMs. 
5. A final feature of the evolution of the Algarve CCAMs merits conment. 
Personal interviews with CCAM managers in the spring of 1987 by the 
authors documented fairly high portfolio concentration with a large part 
of the portfolio concentrated in a few large sized loans in same of the 
credit cooperatives. Also the camnon practice of rescheduling loans 
falliIYJ due could be hiding a p:>tential growing loan arrears problem in 
sane CCAMs. Both of these fears have led to the creation of a Central 
Liquidity Fund to draw off excess liquidity, intermediate between 
surplus and deficit units, and act as a lender of last resort to the 
national ne~rk of CCAMs. This last function will shortly be 
reinforced by a guarantee fund to be set up through contributions from 
the Central Bank of Portugal and the CCAMs themselves. 
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IV Conclusions: The Emergence of a New System of Rural Finance in Portugal. 
The rapid growth of the agricultural credit cooperatives in Portugal 
illustrate several important lessons al:x:nlt the creation and expansion of 
financial institutions in rural financial markets of LDCs. First it is clear 
that given the proper incentives, credit cooperatives can mobilize savings 
successfully. By the mid 1980s this local resource mobilization allowed the 
CCAMs to gain financial autonany and becane the major supplier of agricultural 
credit in the country. The CCAMs in the Algarve still eleperienced growing excess 
liquidity with declining loan deposit ratios in the face of the decline in demand 
for agricultural loans during the resession years of the early to mid 1980s. It 
was no doubt unwise to loan out all these resources, hence contingency reseives 
were held in conmercial banks until a central Liquidity Fund was established in 
1985 to intermediate these excess funds within and outside the network for the 
benefit of the CCAMs. 
A second lesson from the CCAM experience is that depositors could be 
placed at risk (i.e. moral hazard) in a widely dispersed network of relatively 
autonanous credit cooperatives operating in a weak regulatory environment. Thus 
the authorities view the recently created Central Liquidity Fund (ca.ixa Central) 
as not only serving an intermediation role between surplus and deficit units and 
check clearing functions, but also acting an inplicit deposit insurance mechanism 
(i.e. lender of last resort to cover deposit runs) for the systen as a whole. 
These functions, taken together, preswna.bly justify the reserves that the CCAMs 
are required to hold in the Central Liquid! ty Fund. 
The third lesson fran the CCAM ~rience highlights both the 
heterogeneity and uneven performance that can emerge in a dispersed system of 
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agricultural credit cooperatives. Field data from the Algarve documented several 
large, solid CCAMs with relatively stable returns, and many smaller units with 
JOOre problematical performances in their statutory areas of operation. Portfolio 
concentration, a high incidence of rescheduled loans and highly leveraged equity 
or capital multipliers are evident in a number of these cooperatives. This in 
part grow out of inexperienced management. However this also results from the 
statutory constraints that prevent mergers of cooperatives across geographical 
lines to gain scale econanies and limit lending activity to agriculture thereby 
preventing diversification or scope econanies in the loan portfolio. 
The OOAM roovement is currently at a crossroads in Portugal. Should the 
set of roughly 220 CCAMs remain locked into their current set of statutory rules 
limiting scale and scope econanies? If so, the Central Liquidity Fund., 
established to act as a mini central bank an their behalf will have to be given 
the opportunity to gain the scale econanies and diversified portfolio denied to 
the member cooperatives. or should the current statutory limitations on CC.AM 
lending and mergers 'be relaxed to allow these field-level institutions to acquire 
JOOre wide spread services and financial products. If the latter pa.th is 
foll~ the cooperative movement will have to abandon its special tax exempt 
status and becane subject to the same competitive rules governing comnercial 
banks in Portugal. The correct decision is still an open question. This issue 
merits JOOre detailed field studies and research an the financial viability of 
the credit cooperatives and the potential scale and scope econanies in the CCAM 
netN::>rk in Portugal . 
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Table 1 
Financial Market Indicators for Agricultural and 
Non-Agricultural Credit in Portugal 1979-85-86 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 ~ 1985 (1) (2) ( 3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1. .Index of Real Credit (1980 = 100) 
a) Ag. Credit (new loans) 100 71.4 72.6 64.2 50.5 29.1 
b) Non-Ag. Credit (new loans) 100 71.2 65.6 67.2 61.6 56.2 
2. Share of Vol. of Credit 
End Period Bal. 
a} Ag. Credit/Total Credit .04 .03 .04 .04 .03 .03 .03 
b) Ag. Credit/Ag. GDP .24 .26 .41 .39 .38 .32 .28 
c) Non-Ag Credit/Non Ag. GDP .82 .82 .96 .96 .97 .97 .98 
3. CCAM Credit Activity {%~ 
a) CCAM Loans/Total Ag Credit Bal. - .21 .32 .39 .45 .50 
.67 (1986) 
Source: Banco do Portugal, International Financial Statistics 
Table 2 
Relative Distribution of the Structure of Aggregate Assets and Liabilities 
for the 17 CCAMs (Agricultural Credit Cooperatives) in the Algarve 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
( 1) (2) (3) (4} (5) (6) (7) 
Assets 
1. Vault cash 1.2 1.6 2.4 2.0 2.1 1.2 .09 
2. Deposits 15.9 18.6 20.9 19.2 21.7 26.4 28.5 
3. Loans 82.2 78.8 73.8 69.7 64.2 60.4 60.4 
4. Fixed Assets 0.5 0.7 1.8 2.7 3.7 3.9 3.6 
5. Other Assets 
-2.:l 0.3 --14 6.4 8.3 _§_:.! ~ 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Liabilities 
1. Sight Deposits 27.2 24.1 30.2 25.2 18.3 17.8 19.8 
2. Time Deposits 16.4 22.4 30.1 42.4 45.8 52.2 56.6 
3. Borrad.ngs 51.2 49.3 33.4 24.7 26.6 20.0 14.1 
4. Other Liabilities 0.2 0.2 2.5 4.6 6.9 6.7 4.7 
5. Net W::>rth 5.0 4.0 3.8 3.1 2.4 3.3 4.8 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Financial Statements of CCAMs in the Algarve 
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Table 3 
Financial Indicators for the Network of Agricultural 
Credit Cooperatives in the Algarve 1978-1986 
Jpdicators 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1. Return on Eaui~(%} 21.3 21.2 29.4 27.3 35.7 28.3 50.9 47.4 42.5 
a) Coefficient of 
Variation 0.9 0.7 2.8 1.0 -3.8 2.2 1.4 1.9 0.5 
b) Range over Mean 16.5 2.8 11.9 3.4 -15.6 9.8 2.8 6.5 2.1 
2. Equity Multiplier (ab 15.2 16.6 19.9 25.2 26.1 32.8 41.4 30.2 21.0 
3. Capital Asset Ratio{ ) 6.6 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.8 3.1 2.4 3.3 4.8 
Sources: Derived from financial statements of the 17 CCAMs in the Algarve 
Notes: a Assets/Net Worth 
b Net Worth/Assets 
Table 4 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients for Selected Performance 
Indicators of the 17 CCAMs in the Algarve for Selected Years 
Indicator 
1. Correlation between the Coefficient 
of Variation of ROE (1978-86) 
and Size of CCAM in 1986 
2. correlation between Rate of Return 
of F.qui ty {ROE) and CC.AM Size 
a) 1985 
b) 1986 
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